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19801 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
interest in protecting its treasury as well as society's interest in
discouraging wanton and reckless conduct by governmental em-
ployees."'
Rose Frances DiMartino
Release agreement held no bar to negligence action under rule of
strict construction
It has long been the rule in New York that exculpatory agree-
ments345 intended to insulate one of the contracting parties from
liability for his own ordinary negligence are enforceable3 4  absent
statutory prohibition 34 7 or overriding public policy.348 Because they
undesirable to permit liability shifting through insurance despite possible adverse conse-
quences to the municipal fisc. Where liability is vicarious, a municipality should be held
responsible for failing to carefully select and train its employees, rather than shifting the
burden to taxpayers. See McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,
27 DE PAUL L. REv. 571, 577-78 (1978). Where punitive damages are levied directly against a
municipality, society's interest in punishing and deterring antisocial conduct should take
precedence over a threat to a city's financial stability. While the innocent citizenry ulti-
mately will provide the funds from which the award is paid under these approaches, the
dual aims of punishment and deterrence nevertheless are effected because of the citizens'
power to remove those officials whose policies gave rise to the award.
See note 340 supra.
3" The term "exculpatory agreement" has been used indiscriminately by the courts to
encompass both releases and covenants not to sue. Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc. 2d
957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979). Technically, however, a "release" is the
present abandonment of an existing right or claim, while a "covenant not to sue" is a pro-
spective promise to forego a right of action that may accrue in the future. Id. at 963, 414
N.Y.S.2d at 871-72. Since a prospective disclaimer, other than one between joint tortfeasors,
operates as a complete and permanent bar to a cause of action, it has the same legal effect
as a release. Id. at 965, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 873. For purposes of this Survey, the technical
differences between these terms will be regarded as immaterial.
" Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d
693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963); Phibbs v. Ray's Chevrolet Corp., 45 App. Div. 2d 897, 357
N.Y.S.2d 211 (3d Dep't 1974); e.g., Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177
N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1961); Church v. Seneca County Agricultural Soc'y, 41 App.
Div. 2d 787, 341 N.Y.S.2d 45 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 571, 310 N.E.2d 541, 354 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1973); Solodar v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 552, 317 N.Y.S.2d
228 (3d Dep't 1971). See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1750 (3d ed. 1972).
M Agreements purporting to exempt parties engaged in certain businesses serving the
public from liability for their own negligence have been rendered "void as against public
policy and wholly unenforceable" by statutory directive. See GOL § 5-321 (landlords); id. §
5-322 (caterers); id. § 5-323 (building service and maintenance contractors); id. § 5-325 (ga-
rages and parking facilities); id. § 5-326 (places of public amusement and recreation).
3' Releases purporting to exculpate parties from liability for injuries caused by gross
negligence or intentional wrongs, however, are absolutely void as against public policy. See,
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are viewed with disfavor by the courts, 4 9 however, contractual dis-
claimers of liability traditionally have not been given effect unless
the intent to exculpate a party from the consequences of his own
fault is expressed in clear and unequivocal language.35 0 This rule of
strict construction, however, has been applied less rigorously to in-
demnification contracts.35 1 It is not the express language of the
agreement that controls but the "unmistakable intent of the par-
ties" to encompass the indemnitee's own negligence, an intent
which may be adduced from the circumstances surrounding the en-
e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152, 157 (1920); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms,
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 297, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (1961); Krivitsky &
Cohen, Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 129 Misc. 431, 435, 221 N.Y.S. 525, 529 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. N.Y. County 1927), modified, 227 N.Y.S. 836 (1st Dep't 1928). See generally 6A A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 574, 575 (1932); S. WIL-
LISTON, supra note 346, § 1750A.
There is also a judicially recognized public policy against enforcing exculpatory clauses
where a special relationship exists between the parties. See, e.g., Conklin v. Canadian-Colo-
nial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 247, 194 N.E. 692, 693 (1935) (common carrier and passen-
ger); Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 382, 77 N.E. 388, 389 (1906) (employer and em-
ployee); Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 156 Misc. 562, 563, 282 N.Y.S. 280, 281 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County), aff'd mem., 246 App. Div. 787, 286 N.Y.S. 439 (4th Dep't 1935) (public
utility and customer).
'19 Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 304, 189
N.E.2d 693, 694, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1963); Phibbs v. Ray's Chevrolet Corp., 45 App.
Div. 2d 897, 897-98, 357 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (3d Dep't 1974); Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc.,
281 App. Div. 568, 570, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (1st Dep't 1953), affd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d
836 (1954); Howard v. Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc., 279 App. Div. 72, 75-76, 107 N.Y.S.2d
749, 752 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 990, 106 N.E.2d 67 (1952); Johnston v. Fargo, 98
App. Div. 436, 442, 90 N.Y.S. 725, 730 (4th Dep't 1904), affd, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388
(1906). In determining the validity of contractual disclaimers of liability, a conflict emerges
between the principle of freedom of contract and a judicial reluctance to allow a party to
absolve himself from responsibility for consequences attributable to his negligent conduct.
Exculpatory agreements are disfavored because they are at variance with the modern" 'con-
cepts of justice and fair dealing,' " which require that an injured party should not be de-
prived of his remedy for injuries resulting from another's wrongdoing. Lee v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 95 Misc. 2d 120, 131, 407 N.Y.S.2d 777, 785 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978)
(quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957)).
Moreover, it has been postulated that releases of liability may actually tend to foster care-
lessness, since a party freed from legal responsibility for his misconduct may cease to exer-
cise that standard of care normally required of him. Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 494, 180 N.E. 245, 246 (1932). See generally 6A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1472 (1962); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 602A, 626 (3d ed. 1961).
35o Willard Van Dyke Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d
693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 1016,
1018, 158 N.E.2d 128, 129, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268, 268 (1959) (mem.).
I" See Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.E.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971);
Liff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 23 N.Y.2d 854, 245 N.E.2d 800, 298 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1969)
(mem.); Kurek v. Port Chester Hous. Auth., 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612
(1966).
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tire agreement. 52 Recently, in Gross v. Sweet,3 3 the Court of Ap-
peals refused to extend this less exacting rule of construction to a
personal injury release, holding that an exculpatory agreement
drafted in general terms was insufficient to bar a personal injury
claim grounded specifically in negligence.
3 54
Prior to enrolling in a parachute jumping course conducted by
the defendant, plaintiff in Gross executed a "Responsibility Re-
lease" in which he agreed to waive "any and all claims. . . for any
personal injuries. . . that [he] may sustain or which may arise out
of [his] learning, practicing or actually jumping from an air-
craft. 3 55 After one hour of on-the-ground instruction, 56 the plain-
352 The rule of Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35
(1936), which had previously controlled the standard of construction to be applied to all
exoneration provisions, has been liberalized in the context of indemnity agreements. In
Thompson-Starrett, the Court of Appeals found that a broadly drafted indemnity contract
exempting a general contractor from "any and all liability" was ineffective to impose a duty
of indemnification on its subcontractor for injuries caused by the indemnitee's own negli-
gence. Id. at 41, 2 N.E.2d at 37. The Thompson-Starrett test was eroded, however, by a
series of decisions in which the Court determined that exoneration clauses in commercial
leases were enforceable if the nature of the agreement evidenced an "unmistakable intent"
to encompass the indemnitee's negligence, although the language of the agreement was
somewhat equivocal. See Liff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 23 N.Y.2d 854, 855, 245 N.E.2d
800, 800, 298 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (1969) (mem.); Kurek v. Port Chester Hous. Auth., 18 N.Y.2d
450, 456, 223 N.E.2d 25, 27, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1966). Finally, in Levine v. Shell Oil Co.,
28 N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.E.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971), the Court enunciated a "plain
meaning" test for interpreting indemnity provisions, id. at 210, 269 N.E.2d at 801, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 84, and concluded that Thompson-Starrett "is no longer a viable statement of
the law." Id. at 211-12, 269 N.E.2d at 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86. See generally The Quar-
terly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 355, 367 (1971).
While the Levine decision was narrowly construed by the lower courts, see The Quar-
terly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 561, 566-68 (1972); see, e.g., Redding v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
67 Misc. 2d 464, 324 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), afl'd, 38 App. Div. 2d 850
(2d Dep't 1972), the Court of Appeals subsequently clarified the scope of the Levine holding
by finding that a party's own negligence is encompassed by an indemnification agreement
whenever the "intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and pur-
poses of the entire agreement, and the surrounding facts and circumstances." Margolin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 153, 297 N.E.2d 80, 83, 344 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339
(1973). Clearly, therefore, the validity of indemnification provisions no longer turns on "se-
mantic stereotypes with which an agreement may be phrased," but will be construed so as to
give effect to the parties' intentions. Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153,
159, 366 N.E.2d 263, 266, 397 N.Y.S.2d 602, 606 (1977).
-1- 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979), aff'g 64 App. Div.2d 774,
407 N.Y.S.2d 254 (3d Dep't 1978).
'3 Id. at 104-05, 108, 400 N.E.2d at 307, 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 366, 369.
315 Id. at 109, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
'" Id. at 105, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 366. The plaintiff was given the de-
fendant's routine introductory lesson, which included oral instruction and several jumps off
a two and a half foot table. Id.
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tiff, under the defendant's supervision, made his first practice
jump from an altitude of 2,800 feet and suffered a broken leg upon
landing.3 57 In the plaintiff's subsequent personal injury action,358
the Supreme Court, Ulster County, finding that the release barred
the plaintiff's suit, granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint.359 A divided appellate divi-
sion reversed, however, on the ground that the terms of the dis-
claimer were not sufficiently explicit to preclude a cause of action
based on the defendant's negligence in instructing and equipping
the plaintiff.360
On appeal, a closely divided Court of Appeals affirmed the ap-
pellate division361 Judge Fuchsberg, writing for the majority,3 62
noted the antipathy with which such exemptions from liability
have traditionally been treated by the courts.6 Although the de-
fendant's business was deemed to be outside the purview of New
York's anti-exculpation statutes, 64 the Court reaffirmed the gen-
eral rule that an exculpatory clause will not be enforced absent an
"I Gross v. Sweet, 64 App. Div. 2d 774, 774, 407 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (3d Dep't 1978),
afJ'd, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979).
351 The plaintiff's complaint was grounded in negligence, gross negligence, and breach
of warranty based on the defendant's instruction and outfitting of the plaintiff, his failure to
comply with Federal Aviation Administration regulations, and his failure to warn of the
risks inherent in parachute jumping. 49 N.Y.2d at 105, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
367.
"50 64 App. Div. 2d at 774, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
3"o Id. at 775, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 256. The appellate division scrutinized the release in the
context of the student and teacher relationship and concluded that it did not sufficiently
evidence "a clear understanding between the parties" that the defendant's negligent con-
duct would be encompassed by the agreement. 64 App. Div. 2d at 775, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 255-
56.
361 49 N.Y.2d at 110, 400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
362 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Wachtler and Gabrielli joined Judge Fuchsberg in
the majority opinion. Judges Jasen and Meyer joined Judge Jones in his dissent.
3M3 49 N.Y.2d at 106, 400 N.E.2d at 308, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
38' Id. at 107, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368; see note 347 supra. Although the
Gross Court characterized the parachute training school owned and operated by the defend-
ant as a "facility" and parachute jumping as a "sport," 49 N.Y.2d at 105, 400 N.E.2d at 308,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 366, it declined to hold that it was within the scope of GOL § 5-326, gov-
erning agreements entered into by the "owner or operator of any pool, gymnasium, place of
amusement or recreation, or similar establishment and the user of such facilities ... " Id.
at 107, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368. A contrary conclusion was reached by the
fourth department in Wurtzer v. Seneca Sport Parachute Club, 66 App. Div. 2d 1002, 411
N.Y.S.2d 763 (4th Dep't 1978), where the defendant, in its pleadings, admitted the plain-
tiff's allegation that it operated a "parachute jumping and recreation center," as described
in its certificate of incorporation. Id. at 1002-03, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 764-65.
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unequivocal written expression of the parties' intention.3 16 While
disavowing the notion that an effective disclaimer must explicitly
refer to negligence,3 6 1 the majority concluded that the broad lan-
guage of the release executed by Gross was inadequate to evidence
an intention to absolve the defendant from the consequences of his
own fault26 7 Moreover, Judge Fuchsberg found that the less rigid
rule of construction applied to indemnification agreements was in-
apposite, characterizing it as an exception to the general rule tai-
lored to the "economic realities" of arm's length dealings between
businessmen. 68
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Jones urged that the more liberal
construction standard should be applied to releases as well as to
indemnification agreements.36 9 Thus, a general release, like a gen-
eral indemnification contract, should be given effect if the intent of
the parties, though expressed in broad terms, can be garnered from
the nature of the agreement.370 Viewed under that standard, the
dissent concluded, the release executed by Gross was sufficient to
exonerate the defendant from liability for his ordinary negli-
gence.3 71 Furthermore, Judge Jones argued that by excluding negli-
31 49 N.Y.2d at 110, 400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
"6 Id. at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 309-10, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
117 Id. at 109-10, 400 N.E.2d at 310-11, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70. The Court concluded
that, at most, the release at issue encompassed only injuries resulting from the risks inher-
ent in parachute jumping and not those resulting from the defendant's want of due care. Id.
Judge Fuchsberg noted that the plaintiff's allegations of gross negligence would not be
barred by the release under any circumstances because such agreements are void. Id. at 106,
400 N.E.2d at 308-09, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
In dictum, the majority dismissed the contention that the relationship between the par-
ties rendered the release agreement unenforceable as against public policy, stating that the
relationship of student and teacher did not fit within those special relationships in which
exculpatory provisions had previously been held invalid. Id. at 106-07, 400 N.E.2d at 309,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68. See note 348 supra. The Court declined, however, to consider
whether the defendant's alleged violation of Federal Aviation Administration regulations
would be encompassed by the release. 49 N.Y.2d at 107, 400 N.E.2d at 309, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
368.
... 49 N.Y.2d at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
'" Id. at 112, 400 N.E.2d at 312, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge
Jones reasoned that since the Thompson-Starrett standard had initially been applied to
both indemnification agreements and releases, the new, less stringent rule of the indemnity
cases, see note 352 and accompanying text supra, should apply in all contexts. Id. at 111-12,
* 400 N.E.2d at 311-12, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370-71 (Jones, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Jones
opined that the rationale underlying the Court's liberal interpretation of the language of
indemnification agreements was likewise applicable to release agreements. Id. at 112, 400
N.E.2d at 312-13, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (Jones, J., dissenting).
370 Id. (Jones, J., dissenting); see note 352 supra.
371 Id. at 113, 400 N.E.2d at 313, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (Jones, J., dissenting). Judge
19801
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gence from the scope of the disclaimer, the majority had rendered
the exculpation clause meaningless since injuries incurred, absent
the defendant's failure to exercise due care, would not give rise to
an actionable claim in any event. 7 2
The Court of Appeals' decision in Gross culminates a virtually
unbroken line of lower court authority which continued to apply a
rule of strict construction to release agreements even after the lib-
eralization of the standard applied to indemnity contracts.3 7 3 In
sanctioning this approach, it is submitted that the Gross majority
correctly determined that the indemnity cases were not intended
to effect a comprehensive change in New York's law on exculpatory
agreements.3 7 4 Because enforcement of a release extinguishes an
aggrieved party's right of action, while an indemnification agree-
ment merely reallocates the liability for his injury,7 5 it seems justi-
fiable that the release should be subject to a more exacting scru-
tiny. Moreover, since indemnification contracts normally arise in a
commercial context,378 the parties thereto are more frequently ad-
Jones, however, agreed that the plaintiff's cause of action for gross negligence would not be
barred by the release agreement. Id. at 110, 400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Jones,
J., dissenting).
372 Id. at 112-13, 400 N.E.2d at 313, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (Jones, J., dissenting).
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Thruway Speedways, Inc., 63 App. Div. 2d 204, 206, 407
N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (3d Dep't 1978); Caravello v. Pine Hollow Stud Farm, Inc., 61 App. Div. 2d
974, 974, 402 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (2d Dep't 1978); Bradley Realty Corp. v. New York, 54 App.
Div. 2d 1104, 1105, 389 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (4th Dep't 1976); Phibbs v. Ray's Chevrolet Corp.,
45 App. Div. 2d 897, 897, 357 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (3d Dep't 1974); Colton v. New York Hosp.,
98 Misc. 2d 957, 967-68, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 875 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979); Philip Wick
Co. v. Lee Dyeing Co., 71 Misc. 2d 82, 83-84, 335 N.Y.S.2d 619, 622 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County
1972), aff'd, 41 App. Div. 2d 905, 343 N.Y.S.2d 595 (3d Dep't 1973).
'7' The Court of Appeals had previously distinguished between exculpatory agreements
and indemnification agreements, holding that the statutory proscription against exculpatory
agreements between landlords and tenants did not extend to indemnity agreements between
the same parties. Hogeland v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153, 161, 366 N.E.2d
263, 267, 397 N.Y.S.2d 602, 607 (1977); see Gottschalk v. Consolidated R.R. Corp., 469 F.
Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
115 The effect of an exculpatory agreement is to allow a party to avoid liability to the
victim of his negligent conduct, thus depriving the victim of an otherwise valid claim. On
the other hand, through an indemnification agreement, the indemnitee does not seek to
exempt himself from liability to the injured third party, but rather to have the indemnitor
assume the risk of such liability. Since the injured party's right to recover is preserved, the
determination focuses not on whether the injured party can recover, but from whom. Hoge-
land v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153, 161, 366 N.E.2d 263, 267, 397 N.Y.S.2d
602, 607 (1977); Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc. 2d 957, 967, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 874
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
376 See, e.g., Levine v. Shell Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.E.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1971); Liff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 23 N.Y.2d 854, 245 N.E.2d 800, 298 N.Y.S.2d 66
(1969); Kurek v. Port Chester Hous. Auth., 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612
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vised by counsel, and the loss occasioned thereby is more likely to
be absorbed by insurance.317 Thus, a stricter rule of construction is
warranted for personal injury releases to prevent an inadvertent
waiver by a private individual of an otherwise valid claim. 7 8
Although Gross declined to prescribe a per se rule requiring
personal injury releases to expressly provide for negligence,79 few
instances can be found in which less specific language has been
held to constitute an effective bar to an action grounded in the
defendant's own fault.38 0 The Court of Appeals, therefore, has
placed the burden squarely on the attorney-draftsman to employ
precise language to ensure that an exculpatory agreement will
achieve its intended objective.
Caroline F. Marks
(1966).
" See 49 N.Y.2d at 108, 400 N.E.2d at 310, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369; Levine v. Shell Oil
Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 212, 269 N.E.2d 799, 802, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (1971); Kurek v. Port
Chester Hous. Auth., 18 N.Y.2d 450, ,456, 223 N.E.2d 25, 27, 276 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1966).
Courts have considered the presence or absence of insurance as a factor evidencing the in-
tent of the parties. See Gottschalk v. Consolidated R.R. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 254, 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 19, 21, 167 N.Y.S.2d 277,
279 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1957), afl'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't
1958).
378 See Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 281 App. Div. 568, 571, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (1st
Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954); Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc.
2d 957, 969, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 875-76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (release to cover only
consequences of "nonnegligent, proper performance").
379 49 N.Y.2d at 110, 400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
311 While the Gross Court stated that the word "negligence" need not appear in a re-
lease to sustain its validity, the example cited by the Court was a waiver of liability contain-
ing references to "negligence" and "neglect or fault" of the defendant. See 49 N.Y.2d at 110,
400 N.E.2d at 311, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 370; Theroux v. Kedenburg Racing Ass'n, 50 Misc. 2d
97, 99, 269 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965), aff'd mem., 28 App. Div. 2d
960, 282 N.Y.S.2d 930 (2d Dep't 1967). In Jaylynn, Inc. v. Star Supermarkets, Inc., 75 Misc.
2d 542, 348 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973), a waiver of subrogation rights was
sustained, although it was phrased in general terminology. The court reasoned, however,
that the subrogation agreement was tantamount to an agreement to indemnify the defend-
ant against claims brought on behalf of plaintiff's insurance carrier, and that, therefore, a
less stringent rule of construction was appropriate. Id. at 545, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 89. Since the
injured party in Jaylynn had recovered his damages from the insurance he had purchased
for that purpose, it is submitted that Jaylynn is consistent with the policy of providing a
party means of redressing his injury.
